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Abstract: This article discusses the collaboration model between
the government and pesantren in dealing with the issue of terrorism
in Indonesia. This topic is important because terrorism has become
a complex issue, and the solution requires good collaboration from
all groups, both government and non-government. Therefore, the
authors conducted qualitative research using in-depth interviews,
literature reviews, and Focus Group Discussions (FGD) as data collection
methods. The informants and participants were the representatives
of the government officers and the leaders of pesantren with various
backgrounds. The data collected were analyzed using Nvivo 12 plus.
The authors found that the government and pesantren had collaborated
to face the issue of terrorism, but these efforts were not optimal
because there were still several challenges. Thus, it is necessary to
develop a model of job sharing to develop the preceding collaboration.
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Introduction
The issue of terrorism in this era is a complex problem
because it involves various aspects such as social, cultural, economics,
and politics. Terrorism has a background that encourages someone
to commit violence and sacrifice his/her life in the name of
jihad. Currently, terrorist networks have become transnational,
but it has also grown into cyber-terrorism that utilizes sophisticated
technology besides their conventional activities.
Its transformation into a transnational movement has posed
challenges towards the governments due to many uncertain
aspects.1 The terrorists have carried out many online activities,
such as member recruitment, funding, and coordination with
their links.
In terms of funding, for example, it is common for them
to commit cybercrime, such as stealing customer’s money from
various banks or getting involved in drugs trafficking. In several
events, the Indonesian National Narcotics Agency (BNN) had
spoken about deradicalization, taking into account the connection
between terrorism and illegal drug trafficking.
Meanwhile, terrorism is often being identified with Islam.
There have been several attempts to discredit Islam—as well as-
pesantren-as the base of Muslim terrorist cadres. Some views
pointed out that pesantren is one of the centers where radicalism
spreads among terrorists.2 For instance, some people build the
image that a person with beard and whose wife is wearing a
niqab is connected to the terrorist link. Moreover, some pesantren
alumni have been considered the main actors in the networks
and several terrorist attacks.3
In this case, the pesantren is defined as an Islamic educational
institution that is established to educate the cadres of religious
Muslims.4 Those who study at the pesantren are students who
want to understand Islam more profoundly and comprehensively.
Theoretically, the pesantren consists of several essential elements,
namely the kyai as the leader and the owner of the pesantren,
the students called santri, a place to study, classical Islamic
books, and a mosque which is used as a center of activity.5
When one of those five elements is missing, then the definition
of pesantren is incomplete.
Concerning the issue of terrorism, it is strange that an act
of violence is reported as a terrorist attack only if the perpetrator
is a Muslim. Moreover, it is considered as related to pesantren.
For example, this could be seen in the bomb blast carried out
by a Muslim family in Surabaya in 2018. By wearing Islamic
attributes, under the name of jihad, they carried out bombings
against several churches. Several other cases, such as the Bali
bombings (2002 and 2005), the bombing at the Australian Embassy
(2004), and the Thamrin bombing (2016), had reinforced the
justification that Islamic groups are involved in the terrorism
movement. Meanwhile, when one committed a similar act of
violence—and sometimes with political motivation—but one
has no connection with Islam or pesantren, it is usually referred
to as a criminal act.6
Media framing strengthens this justification within society.
Many times, society would describe the terrorist as people who
wear Islamic appearance. The government’s perspective is of
no exception. Therefore, on some occasions, the government
authorities visit some pesantren that were suspected of having
links to radicalism. This condition is inseparable from the
growing opinion from the international community, which
has paid particular attention to various pesantren in Indonesia
after the September 11th, 2001 attacks on WTC and Pentagon
since those were considered to be a vital circle connected with
the Islamic terrorist groups.7
Sometimes some Islamic events like preaching were banned
because they were indicated as having a connection with the
spread of radical ideology. At some points, campuses, as education
institutions, were also spotlighting this matter. Media, which
influences public opinion, often portray campus as a strategic
area for the spread of radicalism. On the other hand, both
pesantren and higher education institutions also have prominent
modalities to prevent radicalism from influencing exposure. In
their roles, higher education institutions provide students with
the ability to think scientifically, critically, and open-minded.
Meanwhile, pesantren plays its roles in educating students to
present moderate Islam and be a blessing for the universe.
This condition would run well if there is a good and healthy
collaboration between the pesantren, schools, campuses, scholars,
and the government.8 Therefore, the collaboration between the
government and the other groups is necessary primarily with
pesantren, where the future cadres of Islamic scholars are nurtured.
The war against terrorism should not lead to horizontal conflicts
within the society because of misleading information about
terrorism issues.
Several collaborations have been conducted between the
government and pesantren to face the issue of terrorism. However,
challenges still occur. Therefore, this article answers the question
of how has the collaboration model between the government
and pesantren been conducted? What are the challenges? Then,
how to improve the existing collaboration?
Methodology
To answer the research questions in this article, the authors
conducted qualitative research in three regencies/cities in the
Malang region, consisted of Batu city, Malang city, and Malang
regency. According to data released by the National Counterterrorism
Agency (BNPT), these areas are included as red zones.9 Terrorist
groups consider Malang an ideal place to build networks, recruit
cadres, and prepare their actions since Malang is known as the
center of education and tourism destination.
The authors collected data using in-depth interviews with
various government elements such as the local government, the
police, the Indonesian National Army, the Ministry of Religion,
and pesantren from various backgrounds of the Islamic movements,
literature reviews, and Focus Group Discussion (FGD). Among
the pesantren that were incorporated in this study were pesantren
with Nahdatul Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah, Hidayatullah,
Al Irsyad, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Salafi backgrounds.
After the data were collected, the authors performed reduction,
display, verification, and conclusion. The valid collected data
were analyzed using NVivo 12 plus, through coding, creating
cases, analyzing the matrix framework, and clustering activities.
Various reference sources from scientific journals reinforce the
results obtained. Furthermore, the authors discuss and analyze
the implementation and the challenges of the collaboration
based on sociological and political approaches. The finding
could further develop the collaboration between government
and pesantren by implementing the model of job sharing in
facing the issue of terrorism.
Results and Discussion
Based on the process described in the data collection and
analysis methodology, the authors found several findings related
to the ongoing collaboration between the government and pesantren
in dealing with terrorism, the challenges, and various essential
efforts that need to be optimized. It is expected that through
the new model formulation, the threat of terrorism in Indonesia,
especially in Malang, could be minimized.
The Implemented Collaboration
The data describes that the collaboration of government
and pesantren in facing terrorism issue was not properly managed.
Both institutions have worked hard to face the issue of terrorism,
but they worked individually without intense communication
with each other. Any communication held between both parties
was not directly addressing the issue of terrorism. Therefore,
the collaboration between the government and the pesantren
needs to be improved. The targeted objectives that should be
concerned are both the prevention and handling of the consequences
resulted from attacks carried out by terrorist groups.
So far, because each party is interested in building security
within society, both government and pesantren have worked
on their independent efforts to deal with terrorism. For example,
the government has conducted several actions, in the form of
regulations, institutions, and activities, to face the threat of
terrorism. In the field of regulations, the government has issued
new anti-terrorism legislation (Law No. 15/2003). This regulation
stipulates that apart from imprisonment, terrorist offenders
can also be sentenced to death in cases of an extreme nature.10
In 2018, the government issued the law on the Eradication of
Terrorism Acts No. 5 of 2018, which aims to stop the development
of radical Islamic movements in Indonesia.
In the form of an institution, the Indonesian government
has formed the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT). Its
tasks are to carry out various programs, strategies, and policies
for deradicalization to handle the threat of terrorism in Indonesia.
Although in practice, BNPT cannot work alone. It needs to
collaborate with various other elements such as the Ministry of
Education and various moderate Islamic organizations (for example,
Muhammadiyah and Nahdatul Ulama).11
So far, collaboration with pesantren has only been conducted
on the informal aspect. In theory, the government has several
vital modalities, such as funding, competence, legality, and various
structures.12 However, this potential has not been sufficiently
optimized, including in efforts to limit the movement of radical
groups, for example, by issuing economic sanctions against
anyone associated with terrorist networks. As a result, terrorist
groups and networks are still enjoying their existence.13
Based on the field data found, the provisional government
policy still concerns more about preventing the development
of the terrorism movement by conducting socialization among
the people to obey the government. Also, the government coordinates
its staff to collect data on any newcomers to the village area.
Furthermore, the government has conducted informal
communication with some pesantren leaders to deal with the
issue of terrorism. Usually, the meetings were conducted during
some events, such as the graduation ceremony of pesantren.
The program was often initiated by pesantren to prevent prejudice
about their links to terrorist networks. Meanwhile, the government
rarely invites pesantren to have intensive discussions addressing
the terrorism issue. The informant from pesantren mentioned
that they have had joined a socialization program from the
police about the threat of terrorism, but the program was considered
ineffective. There was no real collaboration program, such as
joint intelligence activities, that should be carried out or at
least should be discussed. Meanwhile, intelligence strategy itself
has very complex components, starting from planning, analyzing,
and action.14
The government and pesantren have the very prospective
potential for collaboration. Moreover, pesantren also have the
necessary modalities in dealing with the issue of terrorism.
Apart from functioning as an educational institution that transforms
values   to students, pesantren also has a social function.15
As an educational function, pesantren aims to produce
Muslim cadres who fully understand Islam and become a blessing
for the universe, not terrorists. Muslim cadres who are educated
from pesantren are expected to be persons deriving the morals
of Prophet Muhammad, who is far from violent. By teaching a
moderate understanding of Islam towards the students, pesantren
can produce outstanding cadres who are not exposed to extreme
liberalism or extreme socialism. Therefore, pesantren are institutions
that can be used as the front guard to ward off radicalism.
In terms of social function, the presence of kyai in pesantren
is an essential factor that becomes the modality to face the terrorism
issue. People are often more obedient to the kyai than to the
government.16 Moreover, the spread of Islam in Indonesian
society could not be separated from the roles of kyai.17 This
strong relationship between kyai, pesantren, and society has
existed since before Indonesia’s independence. Some social values
and local wisdom are often the results of the application of a
moderate Islamic paradigm developed by kyai from pesantren.18
Therefore, it can be said that pesantren have played significant
roles in shaping moderate character and culture in society.19
Thus, the intensive collaboration of government and pesantren
can be an excellent effort to face the issue of terrorism.
The Challenges of Collaboration
Although collaboration efforts have been made between
the government and pesantren in facing terrorism, they are
proven to be not optimal. Some challenges still occur during
the process, such as:
First, sectoral ego. Between the government and the pesantren,
sometimes barriers appear, preventing intensive communication
between one another. Both parties might have the same enthusiasm
to face the threat of terrorism, but their understanding and
views are different. When this condition is not appropriately
managed, the difference would likely create new problems such
as increasing violence on behalf of actors claiming that they are
affiliated with pesantren.
Institutionally, there is no problem between the government
and the pesantren. Essentially, pesantren is one part of civil
society that must be protected by the state. However, concerning
individuals, sometimes negative views emerge from the government
towards certain pesantren. This might affect the policies taken by
the government and as a result, it inflicts the ego of the pesantren.
Besides, the collaboration with pesantren of different movement
backgrounds also needs to be paid more attention. Pesantren
are varied in characteristics, both ideologically and in terms of
networks and movements. Some Indonesian pesantren adhere
to the traditional system, while others have developed into
modern pesantren. From modern pesantren, there are also several
pesantren that are closely connected with foreign groups, of
which they are vulnerable to the exposure of radicalism. These
kinds of pesantren are considered to have strong potential to
produce alumni affiliated with terrorism networks. Moreover,
the leaders of pesantren with different social, cultural, and political
experiences would influence the ambiance within pesantren,
either they are connected with terrorism groups or not.20
Therefore, the efforts to build ideal communication patterns
need to be worked on. Each party needs to have mutual interests
and concerns in their collaboration, leading to an excellent atmosphere
towards exchanging information and discussing related views
on issues and efforts to solve problems.21 The pattern of collaboration
remains based on the interests of the nation and state, which
are interpreted by the government. This means that the government
becomes an instrument of state to ensure the security of all
people, including from the threat of terrorism. In this context,
the government has the flexibility to intervene against various
non-state actors on specific issues and cases.22
However, state intervention should reflect democratic values
and not absolute. If the intervention is inappropriate, the government’s
efforts can be counterproductive in countering the terrorism
issue. If pesantren groups or other Islamic groups feel they are
not being treated fairly, in some cases, state intervention against
religious institutions can increase the threat of terrorism.23 Furthermore,
the government’s efforts to deal with the issue of terrorism could
limit the space for people’s freedom.24
In this case, mutual trust and good communication between
government actors and the pesantren are needed. They need to
collaborate on things that could minimize the potential for
conflict.25 If this pattern has worked, the collaboration can be
developed to face various other strategic issues.
Second, the politicization of terrorism issues. This problem
is a significant obstacle for the government and pesantren collaboration
to face the issue of terrorism. Sometimes, opinions convey that
terrorism is only used as a tool to divert issues by the government
when they have published unpopular policies. It is assumed
that terrorism is part of a setting intended to strengthen government
legitimacy.
In one of the interviews, an informant said that he had a
very enthusiastic friend inviting other people to join Islamic
preaching. Later on, the preaching that he directed was considered
by some people to be connected to radical networks. Finally,
there was a bomb explosion at the location of their study. The
government handled the issue quickly and arrested the management
of the mosque, where the preaching was conducted. In its development,
the problem was realized that the explosion was not caused by
a bomb but only from a firecracker. However, the news has
spread that this study group had a connection with terrorism
links. This condition was considered to discredit Islam.
There is a view that Islam is the ideology behind terrorism.
At the same time, Islam is a religion that teaches peace. In
some cases, indeed, there might be a small number of Muslims
lacking in religious understanding and have high enthusiasm
to fall into extreme attitudes. They reject and are unable to
adapt to developments in modern times.26 Unfortunately, they
claim that their main reason to choose their path is religious
reasons. However, this should not be generalized because it can
create new conflicts within society. Even the collaboration between
the government and the pesantren can be disrupted.
The Need for Improvement
Based on the ongoing development of collaboration between
the government and pesantren, and after considering the challenges,
the growing problem of terrorism issue has to be solved together.
At least several essential things need to be considered to formulate
a more optimal model of collaboration between the government
and pesantren in dealing with the issue of terrorism. Among
these are the following:
First, both parties must understand the root causes and
the development of the terrorism movement. In finding a solution
together, it has to be begun by building common perception in
looking at the root of the issue. In this case, the government
and pesantren must understand the meaning and causes of
terrorism. With this common understanding, communication
to find solutions to problems will relatively be more focused.
According to Jakana Thomas, terrorism is violence perpetrated
by non-state actors to force policy changes on the government
by carrying out attacks towards targets in a non-war environment.27
This understanding is in line with the viewpoint of the United
States Department of Defense, which explains that terrorism is
“unlawful use of force or violence against individuals or property
to coerce and intimidate governments to accept political, religious
or ideological objectives.”28
Politically, terrorist groups carry out attacks because their
interests have not been achieved yet, for example, poverty that
causes life difficulties or attempts to show resistance to authoritarian
government. By carrying out the attack, they hope to get the
public’s attention to pressure the government to do something
or to issue policies that the terrorist group wants. Therefore, the
existence of religion does not automatically become the sole
cause for the development of the terrorism movement. The
marginalization of society, poverty, and feelings of being mistreated
are important causes from a political point of view regarding
the emergence of the terrorism movement.29
Thus, to deal with terrorism, it is necessary to strengthen
the legitimacy and the role of the government in solving national
problems that directly impact society. The government, with
its various elements like pesantren and mass media, needs to
work hand in hand to find the solution to various problems
that occur. This way, the terrorism issue could be solved from
the root of the problem.
In the context of religion or ideology, terrorists often believe
that the government in a country with a nation-state system
needs to be destroyed. For them, the government is an extension
of the kafir system, which divides and exploits Muslim people.
In the Indonesian context, this understanding, based on
political and religious interests, had its strong roots in history.
For example, it could be seen from the effort to establish Daulah
Islam/Islamic State of Indonesia (DI/NII) at the beginning of
independence, led by Imam Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosoewirjo.30
Based on this history, terrorist groups justify their action to
continue the struggle of their predecessors by seizing power
and trying to change the political system and government to a
more Islamic pattern according to their interpretation.31
Therefore, among radical groups, the most visible point of
view is from those who reject the nation-state system or the
legitimate government in power. For them, the government,
like the police and other apparatus, is nothing more than an
extension of the western arm, which weakens Muslims. Because
of this, they often show rejection toward state and government
power by not respecting the flag or by refusing to sing the
national anthem. It is not a rare sight to see them fight against
the government’s wishes. As a result, the existence of this terrorist
group disrupts the stability of society and the nation.32
Related to the movement model, terrorism has grown intensively
by using various online media. However, their movements are
substantially the same. Previously, only men were involved in
the movement, and recently it turned out that children and
women have been involved too. Previously, the movements
were mostly hidden, but today they start showing their existence
in public. It goes further to their preaching events, which are
no longer held exclusively, but more inclusive to attract sympathy
and cadre candidates. These public preachings contain materials
that resemble regular preaching. However, sometimes they would
include contents of criticism towards government.
Based on the data obtained in the field, several informants
said that terrorism exists in Malang, Indonesia. Among the
prominent figures of the terrorism movement was Salim Bin
Mubarok Attamimi, who was killed in Syria several years ago.
The Attamimi network still exists today. Most of their networks
consist of young people who are passionate about Islam but
have narrow Islamic understanding. Some of them even went
to Syria, Iraq, and Yemen.
Therefore, because this religious or ideological motive is
closely related to religious understanding, the government needs
to delegate more roles to pesantren to synergize with the government’s
deradicalization program.
Second, job sharing as an ideal model of collaboration
should be optimized. As previously explained, deradicalization
is a complex problem that requires multi-actors from multi-levels.
Those actors need to carry out healthy and synergistic collaboration
with one another.
Theoretically, the collaboration between institutions will
work well when it meets several conditions. Among them is the
formation of open communication between the collaborating
actors, the existence of honesty, mutual understanding and respect,
mutual commitment, and confidence in their ability to achieve
common goals in collaboration.33 Under these conditions, the
sharing of information related to problems and solutions will
run well and get an adequate response, including how to prevent
the emergence of new problems.34
Therefore, various reports made by the government need
to be communicated with other related parties such as pesantren.
The issue of terrorism should not discredit pesantren just because
of one or two pesantren involved in terrorist networks, or one
or two alumni are connected to the terrorism movement. Misleading
statements from the government can cause a significant impact
because the media would create it as public opinion.35
Hence, in this collaboration, the government needs to ensure
that they are committed to its duties to build public security and
public trust.36 In this case, a smooth and effective communication
pattern is a fundamental matter. The government should provide
sufficient information to pesantren and vice versa. For example,
concerning the curriculum in pesantren, the Ministry of Religion
needs to sit together with the leaders of the pesantren so that
the policies could be implemented without any serious constraint.
This collaboration process is necessary, considering some
pesantren have different curriculum compared to those from
the government. The condition has become increasingly difficult
because the communication space is not wide open.37 One
example of the need for collaboration between government
and pesantren is when the government conducts a deradicalization
program that needs pesantren alumni who are moderate and not
exposed to radicalism. Thus, in its implementation, the government
can request pesantren to play their roles actively in it.
Meanwhile, the government provides regulatory guidance
and assistance in the form of funding. Of course, this pattern
must be regulated by clear laws and be implemented professionally
to avoid any problems, such as corruption.38
Moreover, the government can also collaborate with pesantren
to turn the former terror convicts to be agents of deradicalization.
Regarding efforts to deal with actors who are still active in the
terrorist movement, the government also needs to communicate
with religious leaders, including those from pesantren. So far, it
is often thought that government policies and actions are laden
with political content since terrorist suspects were executed on
the spot. As a result, more in-depth investigations related to networks
and radical thoughts of terrorist groups cannot be carried out
optimally. It even ignites attacks from sites other terrorist networks
that are still active, especially against government officials and
the police, as an attempt to take revenge.39
In essence, the collaboration between the government and
pesantren in dealing with terrorism should not only be top-
down but must also be communicative. The communication
patterns conveyed by the government need to incite enthusiasm
for the emergence of citizen participation and responsibility in
solving issues. In the Indonesian context, especially in Malang,
this pattern has begun to be built in the Community Early
Awareness Forum (FKDM). However, the real implementation
of the FKDM programs needs to be improved.
Several informants in the study stated that they expect the
government and pesantren to optimize their collaboration through
various regular events. They believe that good communication
will be useful to reduce or even to eliminate misunderstandings,
as well as to facilitate government and pesantren to act quickly,
responding to various developing issues. Moreover, with good
communication, the government policies to arrest the terrorists
will not raise suspicion or criticism from the public.40
Simply put, this collaboration between the government
and pesantren is declared successful if it successfully meets several
indicators. Among the indicators is the existence of good communication
between collaborating actors, long-term relationships, success
in achieving common goals such as preventing the development
of terror in the community, or even carrying out the arrest of
several terrorist members.41 This collaboration pattern can be illustrated
in figure 1.
Figure 1. Model of Job Sharing
Without good collaboration, all of these goals will be difficult
to achieve because the war against terrorists is not easy. Even
with collaboration, penetration into terrorism groups, it is still
challenging to do. However, with good collaboration, the potential
to minimize the number of attacks is even more tremendous.42
It needs to be concerned that the number of terrorist networks
in Indonesia is still more than a thousand people.43
Conclusion
Based on the explanation above, it can be seen that the
collaboration between government and pesantren in dealing
with the issue of terrorism has not been implemented systematically
and programmatically. It is only limited to incidental activities,
and it tends to be informal, even though the two actors have









The government has the formal legal power to deal with the
issue of terrorism, both legally, institutionally, and in activities.
The pesantren has prominent modalities with its existence as
an educational institution that also has a social function.
Therefore, the various challenges in building collaboration
between the two actors need to be resolved to shape an ideal
model to deal with terrorism. Some of these challenges are sectoral
ego and politicization of the issue of terrorism with various
interests, including from the media. Therefore, the authors offer
a model of job sharing based on effective communication between
the government, pesantren, and the community. In the author’s
view, effective communication will lead to a complete understanding
of the root causes of terrorism so that the best solution can be
found.
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